

# Freezing the Web: A Study of ReDoS Vulnerabilities in JavaScript-based Web Servers

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# Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)



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
input: "Lorem ipsum"  
processing time:  $O(1)$




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processing time:  $O(1)$



```
input.match(regex);
```



input: "ăóÁş" x 1000  
processing time:  $O(n^x), x > 1$



# ReDoS affects libraries

**we identify 25 vulnerabilities in popular npm modules**

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**hundreds of live websites are vulnerable**

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we identify 25 vulnerabilities in popular npm modules

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hundreds of live websites are vulnerable

## Novel methodology


library vulnerability → website vulnerability

# Backtracking-based Matching

```
var regEx = /^a*a*b$/;
```


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
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input: "ab"

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
```
var regex = /^a*a*b$/;
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input: "aab"

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```




input: "aab"



# Backtracking-based Matching


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input: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"


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


input: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"


# Overview




# Overview



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# Setup



measure in single instance  
setup



manually analyze popular  
packages




analyze 2,800 websites from  
Top 1 million




fifth most-dependent upon  
npm package

# Node.js Particularities






# Node.js Particularities



## Node.js Particularities (2)



# Ethical Considerations



## Few payloads

80 requests in total



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## Iterative probing

most websites use redundancy

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## Safety mechanism

stop after timeout or error



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## Vulnerabilities disclosure

the majority of them have been fixed



## Phase 1: Npm Analysis



### Criterion for vulnerable libraries

We consider a module to be vulnerable iff we find an input that

- is at most 80,000 characters long,
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  - Manually written exploits

## Phase 1: Vulnerable Regular Expressions

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- **Example 1:** content

```
/^([\^\/]+\/[\^\\s;]+)(?:(?:\s*;\s*boundary=(?:"([\^"]+)"|([\^;]+)))|(?:\s*;\s*[\^=]+=(?:"([\^"]+)"|([\^;]+)))*)$/i
```

# Phase 1: Vulnerable Regular Expressions

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- 13 advisories
- One bug bounty
- **Example 1:** content

```
/^( [^\//]+ \/[^\s;]+ ) (?: (?: \s* ; \s* boundary = (?: " ( [^" ]+ ) " | ( [^ ; ]+ ) ) ) | (?: \s* ; \s* [^= ]+ = (?: (?: " (?: [^" ]+ ) " ) | (?: [^ ; ]+ ) ) ) ) * $ / i
```

- **Example 2:** ua-parser-js

```
/ip[honead]+(.*os\s([\w]+)*\slike\smacl;\sopera)/
```

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
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
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- For each scenario, create HTTP level payloads
- In total **8 payloads** corresponding to 8 popular modules


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## Phase 3: Websites Analysis

**P1**

100ms

3x	5x
----	----

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----	----



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100ms


3x	5x
3x	5x

**P2**

200ms

3x	5x
3x	5x

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
P1	P2	P3	P4	P5																				
100ms	200ms	500ms	1s	2s																				
<table border="1"><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr></table>	3x	5x	3x	5x	<table border="1"><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr></table>	3x	5x	3x	5x	<table border="1"><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr></table>	3x	5x	3x	5x	<table border="1"><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr></table>	3x	5x	3x	5x	<table border="1"><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr><tr><td>3x</td><td>5x</td></tr></table>	3x	5x	3x	5x
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
We consider a website to be vulnerable iff:

- statistically significant difference between the response times to **random** and **crafted** inputs,
- this difference increases when the input size increases.

## Phase 3: Response Time of a Non-Vulnerable Website



## Phase 3: Response Time of a Vulnerable Website




## Phase 3: Number of Vulnerable Websites


Exploit	Number of sites affected
fresh	241
forwarded	99
ua-parser-js	41
useragent	16
mobile-detect	9
platform	8
charset	3
content	0

**In total:** 339 (11%) websites are vulnerable

# Defenses



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Rust programming language





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- **Timeout on matching regular expressions**  
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- **Tooling support for identifying ReDoS**  
Java programming language [Wüstholtz et al., TACAS, 2017]

# Conclusions



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


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


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## Is Response Time a Good Estimator?



# Popularity of Vulnerable Websites



## Dimensioning Payloads

Module	P1 100ms	P2 200ms	P3 500ms	P4 1s	P5 2s
fresh	12,000	17,000	27,000	37,500	<b>53,500</b>
forwarded	12,000	17,000	26,500	38,000	53,500
useragent	500	650	925	1,150	1,450
ua-parser-js	<b>38</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>42</b>
mobile-detect	10,500	15,500	25,000	36,500	50,500
platform	7,500	11,000	17,500	25,000	34,500
charset	10,500	15,500	24,000	34,000	48,000
content	8,000	11,000	18,000	25,500	35,500