

Program Testing and Analysis

—Final Exam—

Department of Computer Science
TU Darmstadt

Winter semester 2015/16, March 15, 2016

Name, first name: _____

Matriculation number: _____

GENERAL GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Start this exam only after the instructor has announced that the examination can begin. Please have a picture ID handy for inspection.
2. You have 60 minutes and there are 60 points. Use the number of points as *guidance* on how much time to spend on a question.
3. For **multiple choice questions**, you get the indicated number of points if your answer is correct, and zero points otherwise (i.e., no negative points for incorrect answers).
4. You can leave the room when you have turned in your exam, but to maintain a quiet setting nobody is allowed to leave the room during the last 15 minutes of the exam.
5. You should write your answers directly on the test. Use a ballpoint pen or similar, do not use a pencil. Use the space provided (if you need more space your answer is probably too long). Do not provide multiple solutions to a question.
6. Be sure to provide your name. **Do this first so that you do not forget!** If you *must* add extra pages, write your name on each page.
7. Clarity of presentation is essential and *influences* the grade. **Please write or print legibly.** State all assumptions that you make in addition to those stated as part of a question.
8. Your answers can be given either in English or in German.
9. With your signature below you certify that you read the instructions, that you answered the questions on your own, that you turn in your solution, and that there were no environmental or other factors that disturbed you during the exam or that diminished your performance.

Signature: _____

To be filled out by the correctors:

| Part | Points | Score |
|-------|--------|-------|
| 1 | 4 | |
| 2 | 8 | |
| 3 | 10 | |
| 4 | 12 | |
| 5 | 12 | |
| 6 | 12 | |
| Total | 60 | |

Part 1 [4 points]

1. Which of the following statements is true? (Only one statement is true.)
 - (a) Artemis uses feedback from executed event handlers to decide which events to trigger next.
 - (b) Automated GUI testing has fully explored the behavior of an application when it has triggered each event (e.g., click on a particular button) once.
 - (c) Automated GUI testing does not require any test oracle because the application is used through its user interface.
 - (d) EventBreak guarantees to find any responsive problem that is caused by two related events.
 - (e) SwiftHand explores an application based on a user-provided finite state model of the application.

2. Which of the following statements is true? (Only one statement is true.)
 - (a) The path conditions summarize the branch decisions taken when executing a particular path through a program.
 - (b) The execution tree of a program with a finite control flow graph is finite.
 - (c) Symbolic execution scales to more complex programs than concolic execution because it does not need to execute the program.
 - (d) Symbolic execution ignores all interactions of a program with its environment because they are irrelevant for the program's behavior.
 - (e) Concolic execution can perfectly predict the path that is going to be executed with a particular input because it knows all runtime values.

3. Which of the following statements is true? (Only one statement is true.)
 - (a) Full branch coverage implies full path coverage.
 - (b) Full loop coverage implies full path coverage.
 - (c) Full path coverage implies full branch coverage.
 - (d) Full branch coverage implies full loop coverage.
 - (e) Full loop coverage implies full branch coverage.

4. Which of the following statements is true? (Only one statement is true.)
 - (a) A data race occurs when two concurrent threads attempt to read the same value.
 - (b) A program that uses thread-safe classes is free of concurrency bugs.
 - (c) Eraser's lockset algorithm analyzes the order in which memory accesses occur and detects unordered accesses.
 - (d) Concurrency bugs are easy to debug because they occur deterministically.
 - (e) CHES systematically explores the interleavings of a concurrent program.

Part 3 [10 points]

Consider the following program and suppose it gets analyzed with the Daikon invariant detector:

```
1 function foo(x, y) {
2   var k = x, z = 0;
3   if (x !== y) {
4     k = x;
5     while (k > 0) {
6       // LOOP_INVAR
7       z += y;
8       k--;
9     }
10  }
11  return z;
12 }
13
14 var a = 3, b = 3, c = 5;
15 foo(a, b);
16 foo(a, c);
17 foo(b, c);
18 foo(c, b);
```

- Provide two invariants that Daikon would infer at the entry of function `foo`.

- Provide two invariants that Daikon would infer at location `LOOP_INVAR`.

Suppose that Daikon has inferred the following invariants at the exit of function `foo`:

- (1) `k >= 0`
- (2) `z >= 0`

- Which of these invariants may not hold in executions where function `foo` is called with arguments different from the above calls?

- Provide arguments for `foo` that violate at least one of these invariants, and explain why the invariant is violated.

Part 4 [12 points]

Consider the following JavaScript program.

```

1 var a = readInput();
2 var b = readInput();
3 var x = 5;
4 var y = -5;
5 while (a) {
6   if (b) {
7     y++;
8   }
9   x = a;
10  a--;
11 }
12 var sliceHere = x;

```

Compute the static backward slice for variable `sliceHere` at line 12. Use the slicing approach of Weiser (IEEE TSE, 1984) and its formulation as a graph reachability problem, as it has been introduced in the lecture. To describe your solution, follow the steps outlined below.

1. Provide the data flow dependences between statements in the program. Use the following table to summarize the dependences. Each table cell represents a pair of statements. Mark all pairs of statements that have a definition-use relationship.

| Def | Use | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 12 | |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | | | | | | | | | | | |

2. Provide the control flow dependences between statements in the program. Describe your solutions as a sequence of "Statement .. is control-flow dependent on statement .." sentences.

3. Summarize the data flow dependences and the control flow dependences into a program dependence graph. Use the following template to draw your solution.

1

2

3

4

5

6

9

10

7

12

—▶ .. destination is data-dependent on source

----▶ .. destination is control-dependent on source

4. What is the slice for the slicing criterion (variable `sliceHere` at line 12)? Write down the source code of the sliced program as a syntactically correct program.

Part 5 [12 points]

Consider the following JavaScript program, which is annotated with an information flow policy. The policy marks `pwd` as “top secret” and `user` as “confidential”. All other values are considered to be “public” by default. Furthermore, the policy states that `console.log` is an untrusted sink, i.e., only public information is allowed to be passed into `console.log`.

```
1 var pwd = "a";    // top secret
2 var user = "Joe"; // confidential
3 var pwdLength = pwd.length;
4 var count = 0;
5 while (pwdLength > 0) {
6   pwdLength--;
7   count++;
8 }
9 var s = user+ "'s password";
10 s += " has "+count+" character(s)";
11 console.log(s);  // untrusted sink
```

The security labels in this example are elements of a three-element lattice where

- the set of security classes is $\{ \text{"top secret"}, \text{"confidential"}, \text{"public"} \}$,
- the partial order is defined by $\{ \text{"top secret"} \rightarrow \text{"confidential"}, \text{"confidential"} \rightarrow \text{"public"} \}$,
- the lower bound is "public" , and
- the upper bound is "top secret" .

Questions:

- Define the greatest lower bound operator for the above lattice by giving the results of the operator for each pair of security classes

- Is the lattice a universally bounded lattice?

- Suppose a dynamic information flow analysis that tracks both explicit and implicit flows. What are the security labels of variables and expressions, and what is the security stack at different points during the execution? Use the following template to provide your answer (you need to fill in the last two columns).

| Line | Variable or expression | Security label of variable or expression (after executing the line) | Security stack (after executing the line) |
|------|------------------------|---|---|
| 1 | pwd | | |
| 2 | user | | |
| 3 | pwdLength | | |
| 4 | count | | |
| 5 | pwdLength > 0 | | |
| 6 | pwdLength | | |
| 7 | count | | |
| 5 | pwdLength > 0 | | |
| 9 | s | | |
| 10 | s | | |
| 11 | s | | |

- Does the execution violate the information flow policy? Why (not)?

Part 6 [12 points]

Suppose the following SIMP program and an initial store $\{x \mapsto 3, y \mapsto 0\}$:

```
if !x > 0 then y = !x else skip
```

- Provide the evaluation sequence of the program using the small-step operational semantics of SIMP. For your reference, the following page provides the axioms and rules that have been introduced in the lecture (copied from Fernandez' book).

$\langle \text{if } !x > 0 \text{ then } y = !x \text{ else skip}, \{x \mapsto 3, y \mapsto 0\} \rangle$

→ _____

→ _____

→ _____

→ _____

→ _____

- Is the program divergent?
- Is the program blocked?
- Is the program terminating?

Reduction Semantics of Expressions:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{}{\langle !l, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle n, s \rangle \text{ if } s(l) = n} \text{ (var)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle n_1 \text{ op } n_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle n, s \rangle \text{ if } n = (n_1 \text{ op } n_2)} \text{ (op)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle n_1 \text{ bop } n_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle b, s \rangle \text{ if } b = (n_1 \text{ bop } n_2)} \text{ (bop)} \\
\\
\frac{\langle E_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_1, s' \rangle}{\langle E_1 \text{ op } E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_1 \text{ op } E_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (opL)} \quad \frac{\langle E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_2, s' \rangle}{\langle n_1 \text{ op } E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle n_1 \text{ op } E'_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (opR)} \\
\\
\frac{\langle E_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_1, s' \rangle}{\langle E_1 \text{ bop } E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_1 \text{ bop } E_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (bopL)} \quad \frac{\langle E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'_2, s' \rangle}{\langle n_1 \text{ bop } E_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle n_1 \text{ bop } E'_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (bopR)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle b_1 \wedge b_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle b, s \rangle \text{ if } b = (b_1 \text{ and } b_2)} \text{ (and)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle \neg b, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle b', s \rangle \text{ if } b' = \text{not } b} \text{ (not)} \quad \frac{\langle B_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle B'_1, s' \rangle}{\langle \neg B_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \neg B'_1, s' \rangle} \text{ (notArg)} \\
\\
\frac{\langle B_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle B'_1, s' \rangle}{\langle B_1 \wedge B_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle B'_1 \wedge B_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (andL)} \quad \frac{\langle B_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle B'_2, s' \rangle}{\langle b_1 \wedge B_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle b_1 \wedge B'_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (andR)}
\end{array}$$

Reduction Semantics of Commands:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\langle E, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle E', s' \rangle}{\langle l := E, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle l := E', s' \rangle} \text{ (:=R)} \quad \frac{}{\langle l := n, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \text{skip}, s[l \mapsto n] \rangle} \text{ (:=)} \\
\\
\frac{\langle C_1, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle C'_1, s' \rangle}{\langle C_1; C_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle C'_1; C_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (seq)} \quad \frac{}{\langle \text{skip}; C, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle C, s \rangle} \text{ (skip)} \\
\\
\frac{\langle B, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle B', s' \rangle}{\langle \text{if } B \text{ then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \text{if } B' \text{ then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2, s' \rangle} \text{ (if)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle \text{if True then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle C_1, s \rangle} \text{ (if}_\top\text{)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle \text{if False then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle C_2, s \rangle} \text{ (if}_\text{F}\text{)} \\
\\
\frac{}{\langle \text{while } B \text{ do } C, s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \text{if } B \text{ then } (C; \text{while } B \text{ do } C) \text{ else skip}, s \rangle} \text{ (while)}
\end{array}$$